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HORSE SENSE AND HIGH COMPETITION:
PROCEDURAL CONCERNS IN EQUESTRIAN DOPING
ARBITRATION
HOLLY RUDOLPH*
Rodrigo Pessoa, the world-famous Brazilian show jumper, enjoys a
list of sponsors including Rolex, AMG, and Modt Chandon.' Pessoa's
endorsed products, including bits, blankets, and saddles, are priced from
$22.90 for gullet plates to $2,099 for saddles. 2 Anky van Grunsven, the
Dutch dressage champion, lists nine sponsors 3 and endorses products
retailing for 4.99C ($6.00) for scarves4 to 1,799C ($2,699) for saddles.5
With sponsorships from the likes of Rolex and Volkswagen on the line, the
tension between doing whatever it takes to win and ensuring a clean victory
can stretch any competitor to the breaking point.
In an unfortunate number of cases, that breaking point is reached,
causing riders and their horses to face sanctions from the Frd~ration
Equestre Internationale (hereinafter the "FEI") for doping violations. For
instance, the Beijing Olympics resulted in the investigation of six horses for
doping violations, including a charge against Pessoa for the use of
nonivamide, a synthetic form of capsaicin, which is a pain reliever
sometimes used illicitly to induce hypersensitivity in a jumping horse's
legs.6 Because of the violation, Pessoa was disqualified from the games
and lost his fifth-place finish. Pessoa additionally received a four and a half
month suspension from international competition and a fine of 2,000 Swiss
francs.7 Ironically, Pessoa received a gold medal in the 2004 Athens
* Ms. Rudolph would like to thank Professor James A. Nafziger of Willamette University
College of Law, Professor Edward J. Brunet of Lewis and Clark Law School, and the United States
Equestrian Federation for their help and support in creating this article.
Rodrigo Pessoa, Curiosities, http:/ www.rodrigopessoa.com.br/rodcuriosidades-eng.php
(last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
2 Dover Saddlery Catalog, http://www.doversaddlery.com (follow keyword search "Pessoa")
(last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
' Anky van Grunsven Official Website, Sponsors, http://www.anky.nl (follow "Sponsors"
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
4 Anky Webshop, http://77.61.40.27/ankyshop/index.asp?open=shop&groepid=09&
productid=ATC52503 (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
5 Dover Saddlery Catalog, http://www.doversaddlery.com (follow keyword search "Anky
saddle") (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
6 Pessoa's Olympic Horse Tests Positive for Nonivamide, EQUiSEARCH, Sept. 5, 2008,
http://www.equisearch.com/equiwire%5Fnews/olympics2008/j umping/pessoa%5Fnonivamide%5F0905
08/.
7 Pessoa Stripped of Beijing Result for Drug Offense, GMANEws.TV, Oct. 4, 2008,
http://www.gmanews.tv/story/124878/Pessoa-stripped-of-Beijing-result-for-drug-offense.
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Olympics after the previous gold medal winner was disqualified for
doping.8
Doping has become an ever-present problem in the world of
professional sports. As the stakes get higher and the records get harder to
break, athletes in every sport face the temptation to cheat. Some go to great
lengths to avoid cheating but find themselves unintentionally violating the
rules. Once a blood or urine test has shown the presence of a prohibited
substance (or a "related substance" that is chemically similar to a prohibited
substance9), athletes find themselves embroiled in a unique system of
dispute resolution, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (hereinafter the
"CAS").
CAS is a creature of the International Olympic Committee
(hereinafter the "IOC") and has exclusive jurisdiction over almost all
nonprofessional sport-related disputes.'0  This dispute resolution
mechanism suffers from significant procedural shortfalls and fails to
account for the distinctions between Olympic equestrians and other types of
athletes. Because of this lack of distinction, the refusal to consider
participation in amateur sport employment is especially troubling to
equestrians. Significantly more problematic is the acceptance of the
"consent" of athletes to the arbitration process, as well as the strict liability
doctrine applied to sanctions beyond disqualification.
This Article considers the unique issues emerging in the arbitration
of equestrian doping violations. Section I provides the backdrop of
competitive sports: the International Olympic Committee and its arbitration
body, the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Section II presents the argument
for considering equestrian sports employment based on the cost and
commitment involved in reaching the sports' upper levels. Section III
discusses whether, under these employment considerations, equestrians can
give meaningful consent to arbitrate. Finally, Section IV considers the
fallacies and inequities of the doctrine of strict liability as applied to doping
violations by equestrians.
Ultimately, this Article asserts that equestrians embark on a lifelong
profession, not simply a brief competitive pursuit. Therefore, an
equestrian's consent to arbitrate must be scrutinized in the context of an
employment contract. Furthermore, strict liability is not an appropriate
standard by which to impose sanctions for equestrian doping.
8 Pessoa's Olympic Horse Tests Positive for Nonivamide, supra note 6.
9 Ryan Connolly, Note, Balancing the Justices in Anti-Doping Law: The Need to Ensure
Fair Athletic Competition Through Effective Anti-Doping Programs vs. the Protection of Rights of
Accused Athletes, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 161, 186 (2006).10 JAMES A. R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 40-41 (2d ed. 2004).
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I. THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT
The IOC is a private organization that has owned the Olympics
since the 1894 Congress of Paris. 1 The IOC is the sole governing body for
this most famous international sporting event.12 Operating essentially as an
international nonprofit organization, the IOC exercises control over all
nontechnical 3 aspects of the Olympics directly and through its associated
National Olympic Committees (hereinafter "NOCs"), which govern sports
within their respective countries according to IOC rules.14
Alongside the IOC are International Federations (hereinafter "iFs")
of individual sports. IFs regulate single sports in accordance with IOC
rules and regulations. 15 IFs include groups like FEI for equestrians, FIFA
for soccer, and FINA for swimming. 16 Each IF also has national governing
bodies.' 7 For example, the United States Equestrian Federation (hereinafter
the "USEF") is the American arm of the FEI. These national bodies
administer the rules and regulations of the IF in their home countries, and
members of the national federation are bound to the rulings of the IF.' 8
National federations are responsible for organizing the competitions in
which athletes compete to achieve status as top performers and gain
eligibility for Olympic teams.19
As with any governing body, the IOC has developed dispute
resolution procedures. In 1984, the CAS 20 was introduced by the IOC and
heard its first case in 1986.21 CAS requires its arbitrators to posses
"expertise" in sport, but "expertise" is undefined, leaving standards of
expertise for nominating bodies and the International Council for
" Id. at 19.
12 id.
13 Id. at 41; Bruno Simma, The Court of Arbitration for Sport, in THE COURT OF
ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004 21, 23-24 (Ian S. Blackshaw, Robert C. R. Siekmann & Janwillem
Soek eds., 2006) (not reviewing decisions made on the field, the rules, or the organization of events,
disputes which the sports bodies handle internally).
14 Simma, supra note 13, at 22-23.
15 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 21 n.23.
16 FEI - Frdration Equestre Intemationale, Profile, http://www.fei.org/FEI/FEIOrganisation
/Profile/Pages/Profile.aspx (last visited Nov. 05, 2009); FIFA- Fdrration Intemationale de Football
Association, About FIFA, Who We Are, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/federation/index.html (last
visited Nov. 05, 2009); see FINA - Frdration Intemationale de Natation, http://www.fina.org/project/
(last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
17 Jason Gubi, Note, The Olympic Binding Arbitration Clause and the Court of Arbitration
for Sport: An Analysis of Due Process Concerns, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 997,
1002 (2008).
8 Id
19 Id. at 1002-04.
20 The CAS is commonly referred to by both its English and French acronyms as CAS-TAS.
This paper will only use the CAS.
21 THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004 XVII (Ian S. Blackshaw, Robert C. R.
Siekmann & Janwillem Soek eds., 2006).
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Arbitration for Sport22 to determine.23 Parties like IFs can select their own
choice of law and procedural rules, but CAS provides its own default
procedures and specifies that Swiss law will govern when the IF has not
otherwise specified.24 Thus, unless an IF chooses other governing law,
Switzerland is named the seat of all the CAS arbitrations.
The seat of arbitration is a legal fiction that anchors proceedings
under a particular jurisdiction's authority, while the actual hearings may be
conducted in any physical location to which the parties and the arbitration
panel consent.25 Thus, hearings may be held on-site at major events world-
wide while Swiss courts maintain jurisdiction and apply Swiss law.26
Switzerland's accession to the New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards enables recognition and
enforcement of binding arbitration decisions rendered by the CAS under
Swiss law.27 For example, an ad hoc division was established at the Sydney
Olympics to resolve disputes quickly and keep the games moving28; a New
South Wales court declined jurisdiction over a dispute covered by the CAS
ad hoc panel and referred review directly to the Swiss courts. Although all
of the events surrounding the dispute had occurred in Australia, the Court
upheld Lausanne, Switzerland as the seat of arbitration.29
The CAS is unique among arbitral bodies in a number of ways.
First, the CAS is empowered to issue advisory opinions and frequently does
so.30 Second, decisions are not subject to challenge unless the parties
include, in the arbitration clause, a provision that permits review if a new
and critical fact becomes known after the decision. 31 Third, one of the
22 The International Council for Arbitration of Sport (ICAS) is the body created by the IOC
to govern the CAS in response to the Gundel Case. See infra Part I.
23 LAN S. BLACKSHAW, MEDIATING SPORTS DISPUTES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 122 (2002).
24 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 41. Article 34.3 of FEI Rules specifies that Swiss law
governs all disputes. FEtDERATION EQUESTRE INTERNATIONALE, STATUTES art. 34.3 (22nd ed. 2007),
http://www.fei.org/Rules/Documents/Statutes%20-%2022nd% 2 0ed%2 02 0 0 7% 2 0-
%2015April2007,%20updated%202 lNovember2008.pdf.
25 Memorandum on the CAS Ad Hoc Division (2002), in GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER,
ARBITRATION AT THE OLYMPICS: ISSUES OF FAST-TRACK DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND SPORTS LAW 49
(2001). 26 See id at 49.
27See Reeb, The Role and Functions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), in THE
COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004, supra note 13, at 31, 37; Gerry Tucker, Antonio
Rigozzi, Wang Wenying & Robert Morgan, Sports Arbitration for the 2008 Beifing Olympic Games, in
THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004, supra note 13, at 160, 174-75 (explaining that
Switzerland's accession to the New York Convention did not exercise the option to limit application of
the Convention to commercial matters only, recognizing binding sports arbitrations as identical to other
types of binding arbitration).28 See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitration at the Sydney Olympic Games, in THE COURT
OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004, supra note 13, at 105, 116-17.
29 Id.
3 See NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 43.
31 Simma, supra note 13, at 27.
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major goals of creating the CAS was to expedite disputes in order to avoid
interfering with the completion of Olympic, or similar, events.32 Thus, the
IOC empanels ad hoc tribunals to sit at major events to enable 24-hour
dispute resolution.33 This abbreviated time span avoids barring an athlete
who disputes disqualification from competition, but introduces new
potential problems relating to proof and the ability of a competitor to
present an adequate defense while focusing on performing in a top level
event.
Finally, the operation of CAS was initially funded almost entirely
by the IOC. 34 This raised serious concerns about fairness, since the IOC
was essentially CAS's client. A Swiss Civil Court suggested this structure
was not adequate to ensure the independence of CAS 35 and in 1994 reforms
based on the Court's recommendations resulted in the creation of the
International Council of Arbitration for Sport (hereinafter the "ICAS") by
the IOC to govern CAS directly. 36 CAS was also split during this period
into a two-tier system for ordinary disputes and appeals.37 Ordinary
disputes can be heard by CAS as a tribunal of first instance. Appeals come
to CAS only after final adjudication by a governing sports body.38 While
there are numerous differences between ordinary disputes and appeals, the
most significant distinction may be that appeal decisions are usually
published unless both parties agree to confidentiality, while original
decisions are assumed confidential unless all parties agree to publication.39
Despite an assumption of confidentiality, a decision to publish may still be
made if the arbitrator decides that there is a public interest in the
information, thereby outweighing the right to confidentiality.4 ° In many
doping cases there is a strong public interest in providing access to the
decisions,41 so doping cases are frequently published for their presumed
deterrent effect.42
By December 2001, every Olympic IF, except FIFA, and several
non-Olympic IFs, including chess, waterskiing, motorcycling, and
European football, had adopted arbitration clauses granting jurisdiction
32 See KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 25, at 102-03.
3 3 See id. at 30-32.
34 Simma, supra note 13, at 28.
35 Daniel H. Yi, Turning Medals into Metal: Evaluating the Court ofArbitration for Sport as
an International Tribunal, 6 ASPER REV. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 289, 297-98 (2006).
36 Mary K. FitzGerald, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: Dealing with Doping and Due
Process During the Olympics, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 213, 221 (2000).37 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 43.
38 Reeb, supra note 27, at 23-25.39Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Philippe Bdrtsch, The Ordinary Arbitration Procedure of
the Court of Arbitration for Sport, in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004, supra note
13, at 69, 96-97.
40 Reeb, supra note 27, at 38-39.
41 Id. at 39.
42 See id.
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over all non-technical disputes to CAS.4 3 Today, even FIFA has adopted
arbitration clauses granting jurisdiction to CAS.44 Decisions and awards by
the CAS "are governed by the Swiss Federal Act on Private International
Law" (hereinafter the "Swiss Act") and are enforceable under the New
York Convention.45 The Swiss Act contains grounds for vacatur similar to
the narrow grounds permitted under the Convention.46 Although the theory
does not yet appear to have been tested, a country's determination that
sports disputes are not arbitrable may find itself in conflict with the rules of
an IF that require arbitration.
The United States' passage of the Ted Stevens Amateur Sports Act
of 1978 requires the United States Olympic Committee to provide for the
resolution of disputes involving national governing bodies, amateur sports
organizations, and amateur athletes and gives the Committee the exclusive
authority to delegate jurisdiction over all matters relating to the United
States' participation in the Olympic Games. 4 This statute predates the
CAS and originally granted jurisdiction over sports disputes exclusively to
the American Arbitration Association (hereinafter the "AAA"). 48  This
conflict was resolved through the creation of the AAA-CAS, a division of
AAA specifically designed to hear disputes as a partner to the CAS.49
AAA-CAS decisions are appealable directly to the CAS.50  The Tonya
Harding scandal in 1994 led to an amendment to the Ted Stevens Act that
limits challenges to 21 days or more prior to a major competition.5' This
mechanism prevents a flurry of challenges and accusations from creating a
potential tactical advantage for athletes who would rather not compete with
a superstar.
52
The very first IF to adopt a CAS arbitration clause as part of its
membership was the FEI, whose clause binds all riders competing in FEI-
sanctioned events to arbitrate any disputes according to CAS rules.53 In the
43 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 42; Reeb, supra note 27, at 37.
4Christian Krthe, The Appeals Procedure Before the CAS, in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION
FOR SPORT 1984-2004, supra note 13, at 99, 99.
45 Reeb, supra note 27, at 37-38. But see JANWILLEM SOEK, THE STRICT LIABILITY
PRINCIPLE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ATHLETES IN DOPING CASES 369-70 (2006) (suggesting that
arbitration is a deceptive term employed as a means of bringing awards under the jurisdiction of the
New York Convention, because the word "arbitration" implies that parties are of equal power, whereas
CAS operates as a disciplinary body in doping cases).
46 Reeb, supra note 27, at 37-38 (including erroneous acceptance or declination of
jurisdiction, incorrect constitution of the tribunal, failure to rule on a submitted claim or ruling on a
claim not submitted, violation of due process rights, and violation of public policy).
4'36 U.S.C. § 220503(8) (2000); See generally 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501-220509 (2000).
48 BLACKSHAW, supra note 23, at 117 (the Ted Stevens Act was initially passed in 1978).
49 Michael Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of
Arbitration for Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1206-07 (2005).
'
0 Id. at 1210-11.
51 See NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 85.
52 See id.
53 Gubi, supra note 17, at 1013.
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United States, this clause binds USEF competitors to CAS rules, just as all
national equestrian organizations affiliated with FEI are similarly bound.
Coincidentally, the first significant challenge to the CAS also came from
the FEI.14 In 1992 the case of Gundel v. FEI was filed in Swiss court and is
lauded as "a model of dispute resolution."55
The events leading to the Gundel v. FEI case began with the
discovery of a prohibited substance in the horse's urine.56 This discovery
led the FEI to disqualify both the horse and rider, suspend the rider from
competition for three months, and impose a fine to the rider.s7  Gundel
appealed to the CAS who upheld the disqualification but reduced the
suspension and fine.58 The rider, Gundel, then filed an appeal with the
Swiss Federal Tribunal challenging, inter alia, the independence of the
CAS based on its close ties to the 1OC.5 9 The Swiss Court upheld the CAS
award and officially recognized the CAS as a true court of arbitration, but
also pointed out significant potential conflicts, most notably if the 1OC were
ever to be a party to arbitration. 60  This case led to the reforms that
separated the CAS from the 1OC and restructured the funding scheme of the
CAS.6'
Procedurally, the CAS largely operates independently as an
appellate tribunal.62 Although the CAS is bound to apply the rules of the63_
IFs with which it contracts, appeals to the CAS from a final IF ruling are
not limited to the complaint or to the regulatory scope of the IF's decision.
64
An appeal panel can uphold the decision of the iF, replace the IF's decision
with its own, or quash the lower decision and refer the case back for
rehearing, though this third option is rarely invoked.65 Parties must pay for
their own witnesses in advance, but these costs can be reallocated to either
party by the CAS. In determining who pays, the CAS considers factors
such as fairness, the conduct of the parties, and each party's ability to pay.66
54 Yi, supra note 35, at 297.
" NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 104.
56Gundel v. FEI (CAS 92/63), 1 Digest of CAS Awards 115, 115-16 (1992).
" Id. at 123.
58 Reeb, supra note 27, at 33.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 33-34.
61 Yi, supra note 35, at 298.
62 See Simma, supra note 13, at 27.
63 Rebagliati v. IOC (CAS 98/002), 1 Digest of CAS Awards 419, 424 (1998) (finding that
CAS could not find a doping violation for marijuana despite the IOC's prohibition on marijuana usage,
because the governing sport body did not specify that marijuana was a prohibited substance); See
Christoph Vedder, The IAAF Arbitration Panel. The Heritage of Two Decades ofArbitration in Doping-
Related Disputes, in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004, supra note 13, at 276, 276-
77; Soek, supra note 45, at 370-73.
64 KrAhe, supra note 44, at 99.6
1 Id. at 102.
66 Id. at 103.
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The jurisdiction of the CAS extends to any sports-related dispute,
except disputes regarding the application of field-of-play or technical rules,
unless the rule was applied arbitrarily, illegally, in bad faith, or with malice,
corruption, or favoritism. 67 The CAS can also review a field ruling if the
68
official had no discretion to make it according to the rules of the game.
The decision of whether or not to hear a dispute concerning a field ruling is
made by the CAS. The CAS generally declines to make such decisions
because the rulings have no off-field effect.69 When a ruling has an impact
beyond the confines of that game, such as determining eligibility for an
Olympic or world-championship event, the CAS may opt to hear the
dispute rather than have athletes seek relief from the courts, which has had
disastrous consequences in the past.70
II. WORKING THE RING: EQUESTRIAN SPORTS AS EMPLOYMENT
When one considers the nature of sports, two opposing thoughts
may come to mind: hobbies and multi-million dollar professional contracts.
But between these two extremes lie the many shades of commitment that
represent most Olympic athletes. Some athletes manage to hold jobs, raise
families, and still train hard enough to make it to the top. For others, sports
are all-consuming. Outside the professional leagues of more
commercialized sports like baseball and football, there is little opportunity
for most athletes to make a living at their craft.
For most athletes, training to reach the Olympic level means
relying on grants and subsidies that pay for living expenses and training
costs. Funding may merely pay for a gym membership or trainer, or, on the
other hand, could constitute the entirety of an athlete's income. In the
context of funding, several concerns separate equestrians from other
athletes. The cost of becoming and staying a top competitor, as well as the
burden of bearing nearly all of the disproportionately high costs of training
during a sanction period, make equestrian sports far more comparable to
employment than other sports. For these reasons, it is appropriate to
reconsider how equestrian sports are viewed and recognize that a
competitive career for an equestrian is just that: a career.
67 KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 25, at 121.
6 Frank Oschftz, The Arbitrability of Sport Disputes and the Rules of the Game, in THE
COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004, supra note 13, at 200, 206.
69 Id. at 205-06.
70 Id. at 203, 206-07. See also James A.R. Nafziger, Arbitration of Rights and Obligations in
the International Sports Arena, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 357, 360-67 (2001) (discussing the multiple
conflicting arbitration awards, court rulings and contradictory outcomes in the Sieracki-Lindland case).
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A. Amateur vs. Professional
Much has been written on the benefits and pitfalls of employment
arbitration, but, in general, courts have not considered sports to be
employment outside the professional arena.7' Originally, Olympic Charter
Rule 1 limited competition to amateur competitors, and Rule 26 defined
amateur as "without material gain of any kind.,7 2 A complex Eligibility
Code developed to explain these Rules, which prohibited "playing,
teaching, or coaching competitive sports," accepting promotional
endorsements, or subsidization by the government.73 The Eligibility Code
led athletes to find more inventive ways of supporting themselves while in
training. Efforts to get around the rules eventually made the amateur
classification nothing more than a technicality. The distinction between
amateur and professional athletes largely evaporated as the practical (and
frequently illusory) differences between them became obsolete.74
Maintaining amateur status in a time where competitiveness required year-
round, full-time training had become little more than a shell game by the
time the IOC dropped the word "amateur" from its Charter in 1988. 75 The
IOC now leaves eligibility rules up to IFs, and very few IFs still distinguish
between amateur and professional athletes.
76
Historically, the "classic amateur" was a gentleman of means who
engaged in a sport "for the love of it alone. 77 The term "professional"
emerged to describe English racing jockeys who rode horses for a fee and
were viewed as money-grubbing commoners who competed for the
payoff.78 In this respect, equestrians lead the way in defining the sport and
separating hobbyists from capitalists. Originally, the term "elite athlete"
referred to an athlete who belonged to the social elite and had the free time
and financial means to invest in the pursuit of sporting ability, not to a top
79competitor.
71 See, e.g,. Freeman v. Sports Car Club of Am., 51 F.3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding
that amateur auto-racing is a hobby, albeit an expensive one, and that Plaintiff had the option to race
under other organizational rules and had done so on several occasions); Blubaugh v. Am. Contract
Bridge League, 2001 WL 699656 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (finding that a professional bridge player had no
sustainable cause of action for dismissal from a voluntary membership organization absent fraud,
illegality, or abuse of civil or property rights originating elsewhere, denying claim for tortious
interference with livelihood); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1317, 1319 n.6 (D.
Conn. 1977) (hearing a restraint-of-trade claim from an amateur hockey player based on the unusual
structure of Canadian "amateur" leagues wherein players are actually paid as professionals).72 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 137.
73 Id. at 137-38.
74 Id. at 136-38.
71 Id. at 136-38, 143.76 Id. at 132-34.
77 Id. at 136.
78 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 135-36.
79 See id.
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As time went by, society came to see amateurs not as purists but as
inferiors who were not skilled enough to be professionals. At the same
time, amateur athletes began receiving compensation in a variety of ways
that avoided undermining their amateur status. This form of compensation
allowed amateur athletes to forgo time-consuming employment that would
otherwise distract them from training. Scholarships, no-show government
jobs, subsidies, and other forms of indirect payment began to muddy the
waters that divided amateurs from professionals, and eventually lead most
IFs to abandon their attempts to define and police amateur status
requirements.80 This resulted in more arrangements under which athletes
received non-salary payments and support during their competitive lives so
they could continue training full-time. 8' Today, eligibility is a matter for
the IFs and as long as their rules comply with the IOC rules, NOCs can
provide funding and facilities for qualified athletes.82
B. Who Signs the Paychecks: Funding Athletes
The U.S. Olympic Committee (hereinafter the "USOC") has five
different types of grants available to support athletes in training.83 If an
athlete is on the Olympic roster, the USOC issues a basic grant of $2,500
per year to be dispensed by the National Governing Body (hereinafter the
"NGB") of the athlete's individual sport.84 A recipient of a basic grant with
an income below a predetermined amount and adequate performance can
also receive special assistance.85 There are also options from the USOC for
college tuition assistance and job placement assistance,86 but grants cannot
exceed $15,000 per year, excluding training costs for coaches and
facilities.87 However, one must also consider the availability of prize
money. At the 1996 Atlanta Olympic games, the USOC alone granted
$15,000 per gold medal, $10,000 per silver medal, $7,500 per bronze
medal, and $5,000 for fourth place finishers.88 In addition, NGBs have
their own prize money schemes. For example, the American gold medal
winners in the Atlanta wrestling games took home $25,000, while
80 See id. at 136-37.
I Id. at 136-37.
2 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 143.
83 Melissa R. Bitting, Mandatory Binding Arbitration for Olympic Athletes: Is the Process
Better or Worse for 'Job Security'?, in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004, supra note
13, at 368, 375.84ld.
85 Id.
'61d. at 375-76.
87 Id. at 376.88Id.
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swimmers winning gold medals received $50,000.89 Similar, but lower,
amounts are granted to winners of world-championship games in non-
Olympic years.90
The USEF, the NGB for American equestrian sports,9' is affiliated
with a separate body dedicated to raising funds to support high performing
equestrian athletes. The U.S. Equestrian Team Foundation (hereinafter the
"USET") raises money to provide grants to equestrians in eight
performance disciplines.92 In 2007, USET awarded nearly $2.3 million in
grants to eligible athletes.93  The current campaign aims to raise $20
million to support athletes throughout the period between Olympic games.
94
In large part, this is necessary due to the enormous cost of maintaining a
competitive equestrian team.
C. Horse Cents: The Cost of Equestrian Sports
While the cost of buying, maintaining, and training a horse and
rider to achieve competitive status varies widely, there is no comparison
between training a runner or swimmer and training an equestrian. A track
is a track and a pool is a pool, but equestrian facilities run the gamut. Some
facilities are just an extra stall and no arena, while others have top-notch
training facilities with on-site trainers, vets, medical equipment, and
professional staff. A quick internet search finds full-care95 facilities
available from $300 per month in Illinois 96 to $800 per month in North
Carolina.97 One prominent barn in Illinois charges up to $935 per month for
board and care, and an additional $850 per month for training.98 A rider
using these facilities spends $1,785 per month for basic ownership and
89 Melissa R. Bitting, Mandatory Binding Arbitration for Olympic Athletes: Is the Process
Better or Worse for 'Job Security'?, in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004, supra note
13, at 376.
90 Id
91 USEF Foundation, Who We Are, http://www.usef.org/_IFrames/AboutUs/
WhoWeAre.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2009).
92 USET Foundation, USET Foundation Home Page, http://uset.org/index.php (last visited
Oct. 13, 2009). USET issues grants for High Performance athletes in dressage, driving, endurance,
eventing, para-equestrian, reining, show jumping, and vaulting. Id.
93 Id.
94 USET Foundation, Campaign to Achieve Competitive Excellence,
http://uset.org/campaign.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2009).
95 For the purposes of this article, full board means that the barn feeds, cleans, and moves the
horses between stalls and pastures.
96Brier Bank Farm, Boarding, http://www.brierbankfarm.com/boarding.htm (last visited Oct.
13, 2009).
97 Finncastle Farms, Boarding and Services, http://www.finncastlefarms.com/services.htm
(last visited Oct. 13, 2009).
98 E-mail from Courtney Tripp, Program Coordinator for Tempel Lipizzans, to Holly C.
Rudolph (Mar. 27, 2009, 06:07 PDT) (on file with author). Many of the top barns do not publish their
rates and require personal interviews to provide information to prospective boarders. These barns are
very likely more costly than the amounts available online.
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training. Considering other expenses such as horse feed, veterinary care,
farrier services, and dietary supplement costs, a rider can easily spend
$25,000 or more per year to own a horse. A rescue horse that may not
show any ability can cost a few hundred dollars, while a dressage horse
competing one level below the top can cost nearly $70,000. 99 One proven
dressage stallion is offered for sale for $200,000.00 Other websites
advertise jumping horses for sale at over $100,000 based on potential.' 0 '
These amounts are likely to be misleadingly low, as owners of horses with
the best pedigrees and highest achievements tend to keep their prices
private. Therefore, it is fair to expect that a top-level horse with the
athleticism to achieve at the Olympic level will cost at least $100,000.
Once a horse is bought and boarded, and the training of both horse
and rider begins, then the competition starts. Riders and horses must be
members of the USEF, and consequently, the FEI. Lifetime membership
for riders is $2,500, plus $200 for each horse, and an additional $300 horse
passport fee.10 2 Then, annual registration fees are $15 per rider and per
horse, $75 per competition per year for international events, and
international High Performance fees cap at $420 per rider per year.103 Fees
for individual competitions vary as well, partly depending on prize money
offered. A jumping show offering $30,000 in prize money may cost $500
to enter, plus fees for stalls to board the horses at approximately $250 per
weekend, and additional costs for bedding.' 4 Finally, in order to compete,
a horse and rider must travel to the venue. This is much more expensive
than the transportation costs of a single athlete who can drive alone or take
a commercial flight. Horses require unique transportation either by trailer
or by specialized air carrier, and travel with wagonloads of equipment.
These costs are unique to equestrians. Additionally, equestrians
bear the same personal costs as other athletes with regard to trainers,
equipment, and travel. While all IFs have membership fees and event entry
fees, these expenses are required for the athlete alone and do not entail the
significant costs required for single or multiple horses to travel and stay at
the specialized venues that host equestrian events.
99 Dressage Horse Unlimited, Listing #H-788, http://www.dressagehorsesunlimited.com
/horseDetails.asp?id=788 (last visited Oct. 13, 2009) (Monte Cristo, sold for $65,000, shown at Prix St.
George level).
"o Dreamhorse.com, Listing # 1368318, http://www.dreamhorse.com/showhorse.
php?form horse id=1368318& share_ this=Y (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (Lautrec, a prepotent Holstein
stallion offered for $200,000).
101 Dreamhorse.com, listing # 1366597, http://www.dreamhorse.com/show-horse.php?
fonn horse id=1366597& share this=Y (Caliombo, $100,00) (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
- '02 E-mail from Christy Baxter, Executive Assistant to the Director of Sport Programs, U.S.
Equestrian Federation, Inc., to Holly C. Rudolph (Mar. 16, 2009, 13:02 PDT) (on file with author) (a
one-time fee for international competition).
103 id.
104 Id.
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D. Falling Off the Horse: What it Means to be Out of Competition
In order to receive USOC grants, an athlete must be eligible to
compete. This may mean forfeiting potentially conflicting opportunities
like collegiate eligibility and scholarships, which limits the athlete to
competition exclusively.' 0 5 Because an athlete suspended from competition
is no longer eligible for grants or competition, an equestrian facing
eligibility sanctions is not only faced with losing access to personal support
and coaching, but also left with a host of costs that cannot simply be put on
hold during the suspension.
A suspended equestrian's horse still has to be housed, fed, and
cared for during the time when subsidies cannot be received. When an
equestrian's life is dedicated to training, the athlete is unlikely to find
sudden employment that would pay enough money to support him or
herself and the horse (which alone may cost up to $1,785 per month plus
food). This circumstance tips the scales of an employment analysis for
equestrians more strongly than it does for other athletes, who may more
easily forgo competition and continue training during a suspension.
Because of the cost of training a top level equestrian, the disproportionate
effect of sanctions on a rider, when compared to other athletes, makes
equestrian sports more akin to employment than other sports.
0 6
E. Clearing the Fence: Precedent and the New Analysis
Gasser v. Stinson suggested that a denial of livelihood might
occasion a court review of an arbitration award for reasonableness under
English law.10 7 Gasser began by recognizing that "amateur" status did not
dispose of a restraint of trade claim because of the mechanisms in place
allowing amateurs to receive payments and support.'0 8  The Court
specifically declined to answer the question of whether a contract existed
between the athlete and her IF, although dicta indicated that the court
viewed any such contract as a fallacy. °9 Since the athlete in Gasser
dropped her contract-based claims prior to the hearing, they were not
adjudicated." 0 Ultimately the decision left the suspension in place based
105 Bitting, supra note 82, at 375-77.
106 See SOEK, supra note 45, at 381-86 (discussing the proportionality principle as applicable
in international law and opposed to fixed penalties, requiring fairness and humanity).
107 Gasser v. Stinson, (1988) (Q.B.) (LEXIS); See also NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 68.
108 Gasser v. Stinson, 3 (1988) (Q.B.) (LEXIS).
109 Id. at 13 ("There is an unreality, I think, about the notion of a contract coming into
existence between each competitor and the IAAF [International Association of Athletics Federations] -
not least because entries in competitions are made by the National Federations and not by the
competitors themselves - and even more unreality about the notion of a contract being formed when the
competitor presents himself or herself for dope testing.")
110 Id.
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on a balancing of interests: the difficulty for the IF to prove intent
compared to the athlete's individual interests in continuing to compete.Il
The fact that the Gasser analysis employed such a balancing test
indicates that there are, in fact, interests to be balanced. In the context of
equestrian sports, the balance should rightfully tip in the athlete's favor,
because the cost to the rider severely outweighs the opposing party's
burden in the fight against doping. This balance also tips in favor of the
rider when one considers the trustworthiness of lab tests, which are
increasingly drug-sensitive and can result in false positives. The Gasser
court did not declare that the decisions of sports organizations are beyond
court review, but only that courts should be "slow to interfere," while
expressly finding that the English rules governing restraint of trade do
apply to IF rules." 2 Conversely, another English court determined that the
International Cricket Conference was not an employer for purposes of
immunity from judicial scrutiny. 1 3 This allowed the court to review the
Conference's decisions, which would have been immune from judicial
oversight otherwise. 14 Some nations do not permit the arbitration of right-
to-work claims, while other jurisdictions require that a defendant whose
livelihood may be affected must have access to the courts, regardless of the
presence of an arbitration clause.' 15
Discrepancies also exist between groups of athletes with regard to
both the length of a potential career and the need to plan for post-
competition life. In 1999, the Federal Tribunal of Switzerland heard a
challenge from four Chinese swimmers who claimed that their two year
suspension was "a serious and unwarranted violation" of their rights,
because the sanction was not proportional to the charged violation of
Triamterene's presence in their urine Samples!. 6 The swimmers claimed
that the short time an athlete can remain competitive at top levels meant
that the "suspension effectively ended their careers."'1 7 The Court agreed,
but also maintained that the swimmers had agreed to abide by CAS
decisions when becoming members of FINA and the national affiliate. 8
For equestrians, this element is a double-edged sword. Competitive life
span is arguably a mitigating factor, as riders generally enjoy longer
competitive life spans than many other types of athletes. On the other hand,
extended viability supports the employment view of equestrian sports. A
...Id. at 18-19.
" Id. at 19.
11 Greig v. Insole, (1978) 1 WLR 302 (Ch.); see also NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 69.
14 Greig v. Insole, (1978) 1 WLR 302, 313 (Ch.); see also NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 69.
15 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 45-46.
116 Connolly, supra note 9, at 194 (quoting N., J., Y., W. v. FINA (5P. 83/1999), 2 Digest of
CAS Awards 775, 778 (Tribunal F&1lral Suisse 2009).
117 Id. at 194.
18 Id. at 194-95.
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rider does not face the short career of a gymnast or skater, so an equestrian
embarks on a competitive athletic career with the expectation that their
riding skills will advance over the years. These riders anticipate a lifetime
of competition. A gymnast entering competitive life knows of the precious
few years available to achieve stardom and likely makes plans for support
post-competition, while equestrians can work their entire lives to reach
peak performance. 19 This reality defeats the presumption that a rider will
necessarily pursue another career after a competitive career ends. A rider's
long-term dedication and the very real possibility of a lifelong athletic
career weighs strongly toward viewing equestrian sports as employment.
The Swiss court in the case of the Chinese swimmers ultimately
focused on their consent to arbitrate, but presumed that sports are not
employment. But even absent the designation of employment, two issues
unique to equestrians must be considered by the courts: the disproportionate
expense of becoming and remaining a competitive equestrian and the
continuation of expenses even during a period of suspension. The structure
of the CAS permits a great deal of flexibility in the decision-making
process, but over the years this structure has become more of an analytical
pattern than a fixed legal doctrine. Therefore, there is room for
proportionality in the arbitrator's decision to sanction an athlete, making the
extreme burden imposed on equestrians by even a short suspension a
potential factor in the court's analysis. By incorporating an employment-
based analysis into equestrian cases, the CAS can account for these issues
without necessitating any alteration in the standards of review applicable to
any other category of athlete.
III. CONSENT
The issue regarding consent to sports arbitration has been raised,
and disposed of, by various tribunals. In the context of equestrians, the
issue should be scrutinized more closely because an equestrian athlete's
career is more similar to employment than other athletes'. The employment
analysis, combined with the absence of a collective bargaining structure,
makes the question of consent to arbitration extremely significant. Article
74 of the Olympic Charter requires all athletes, coaches, trainers, and
"9 The three 2008 US Olympic equestrian teams averaged 42.5 years old, with Courtney
King-Dye at 31 to Debbie McDonald at 54 - both dressage riders. The Equinest, 2008 Olympics
Equestrian Cheat Sheet, http://www.theequinest.com/2008-olympics-equestrian-cheatsheet/ (last visited
Oct. 13, 2009). The majority of the teams were in their mid-forties, with eventers slightly younger,
mostly in their mid-thirties. See id. Of the top 20 ladies figure skater in the world, the average age in
2008 was 20.7 years, spanning 15 to 28, with only a handful over 20. IceNetwork.com, Ranking (2008),
http://web.icenetwork.com/rankings/index.jsp?disc=ladies (last visited Oct. 13, 2008). The members of
the US Women's Senior gymnastic team average 17.2 years old as of 2008, with the majority at 16
years. The age range for gymnasts is 16-21. USA Gymnastics, Women's National Teams, http://usa-
gymnastics.org/home/nationalteams/women.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2009).
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officials to submit any disputes to the CAS exclusively. 20 All 205 National
Olympic Committees operate like franchises of the IOC, with exclusive
power to enter an Olympic team in the games, and consequently, the power
to bind an athlete to the IOC's rules. 121 Currently, all athletes seeking to
compete in the Olympics or other international competitions must sign a
waiver granting exclusive jurisdiction to the CAS. 1 2  This requirement
becomes ever more meaningful as the "distinction between 'amateur' and
'professional' . . . fade[s]" away, and athletes are faced with sanctions that
put their very livelihood at stake.'
23
Recognition of an IF by the IOC is necessary for members to be
eligible to compete on an Olympic team. 24 Since 2004, recognition has
required incorporation of the code of the World Anti-Doping Association
(hereinafter the "WADA") into the constitution of each Olympic IF. 2 The
Olympic Charter requires all athletes, trainers, and coaches to comply with
this code. 126 These requirements flow from the IOC to the IFs and then to
the NGBs. Therefore, regardless of whether an athlete has the ability, or
intent, to reach the highest levels of competition, the athlete is bound to the
IOC's rules, including the World Anti-Doping Code and the exclusive
jurisdiction of the CAS. The chain of consent runs as though the
employee/athlete was "hired" by the NGB, owned by the IF, and governed
by the IOC, which imposes the World Anti-Doping Code and CAS.
The 2004 Athens Olympics required all members of a delegation to
agree to the following language as part of their entry form:
I agree that any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of,
in connection with, or on the occasion of, the Olympic
Games, not resolved after exhaustion of the legal remedies
established by my [National Olympic Committee], the
International Federation governing my sport, .. . and IOC,
shall be submitted exclusively to the Court of Arbitration
for Sport (CAS) for final and binding arbitration ....
The CAS shall rule on its jurisdiction ....
'
2 0 BLACKSHAW, supra note 23, at 124-25.
121 Anita L. DeFrantz, Which Rules?: International Sport and Doping in the 21st Century, 31
Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (2008); Olympic.org, National Olympic Committees, http://www.olympic.org
/en/content/National-Olympic-Committees (follow "What is a National Olympic Committee (NOCs)?"
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
2 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 42.12 3 id.
124 DeFrantz, supra note 121, at 5.
125 Id.
126 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 148.
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The decisions of the CAS shall be final and binding.
I shall not institute any claim, arbitration or litigation, or
seek any other form of relief, in any other court or
tribunal. 27
The document containing this language also acted as a visa for families and
guests based on Rule 53 of the Olympic Charter. 28 Contracts between the
host city and the IOC, and the adoption of all Charter rules by the host
nation, permit this unique arrangement. 29 This arrangement places the IOC
in a distinctly superior position vis 6 vis its member nations. One English
court expressly rejected the contract view of arbitration in sports, declaring
the rules of an approved sport organization "a legislative code."' 30 In that
court's view, the imposition of a legislative code should be subject to
review by the courts because the code is setting up a judicial body (such as
a court of arbitration) and giving it discretion, implying that the body will
be accountable for exercising that discretion fairly. 131 Belgian, French, and
EU Courts of Justice have all confirmed that, in some contexts, the
international rules of sport supersede conflicting national policies and
laws. 132 These decisions put athletes almost solely at the mercy of the IOC
and its divisions, with no alternative, no equivalent competitive structure,
and no ability to engage in any sort of negotiation over the arbitration
clause.
"Arbitration is a creature of contract.... Consent to arbitrate is one
,,33of the main characteristics of arbitration. American courts have an
unpredictable relationship with what consent to arbitrate means, but some
form of consent must be present for an arbitration clause to be valid,. What
is less settled is how meaningful that consent must be or how consent can
be obtained. Overall, where courts truly scrutinize consent as a separate
issue is where a party must have agreed to the clause in some way. The
Court in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,134 relying heavily on ProCD, Inc v.
Zeidenberg,'35 affirmed that so-called "shrink wrapped" agreements are
enforceable if the buyer does not return a product according to the terms of
127 DeFrantz, supra note 121, at 8.
128 Id. at 9.
129 Id.
130 Breen v. Amalgamated Eng'g Union, (1971) 2 Q.B. 175, 190 (A.C.); see also NAFZIGER,
supra note 10, at 68.
131 Breen v. Amalgamated Eng'g Union, (1971) 2 Q.B. 175, 190 (A.C.).
132 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 25.
13' EDWARD BRUNET, CHARLES B. CRAVER & ELLEN E. DEASON, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: THE ADVOCATE'S PERSPECTIVE 501 (3d ed. 2006).
13 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
131 Id. (citing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7 b Cir. 1996)).
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the agreement. 3 6 The Gateway Court noted that in ProCD, the defendant
had the option of not purchasing software to avoid being bound by
disagreeable terms and said the same of the Hill plaintiffs; they were free to
return the computer once they discovered the terms.13 7  Thus, the courts
implied that a consumer who does not want to be bound to arbitration is
free to find another vendor with more agreeable terms.
While arbitration is clearly the darling of the American judicial
system, people cannot be compelled to arbitrate where they have not agreed
to do so "openly and fairly."' 3 1 Open and fair agreement is wholly absent
from Olympic competition, or, for that matter, any competition involving
an IF. Because organizations producing equestrian competitions are always
bound by the IOC's rules, there are no alternative organizations through
which equestrians could compete. "The distinctive feature of a contract of
adhesion is that the weaker party has no realistic choice as to its terms."'
139
The IOC rules demonstrate the very essence of an adhesion contract and
seriously undermine the consent element of arbitration agreements by
forcing anyone who wants to compete to arbitrate on a "shrink-wrap" basis.
An equestrian cannot negotiate different rules for the FEI, nor can he or she
compete without the FEI.
In Bauman v. IOC,140 the CAS ad hoc division in Sydney, Australia
recognized that a particular IF did not have an arbitration provision in its
by-laws at the time a suspension was imposed on the athlete.' 41 Despite the
undisputed lack of consent by the federation, the CAS nevertheless used
Olympic Charter Rule 29 to seize jurisdiction. 42 Rule 29 requires that all
IFs conform to the Olympic Charter, which granted jurisdiction to the CAS.
143 Through this bit of maneuvering, the CAS imposed arbitration on the IF
and heard the case. It is apparent that the CAS exercises an extreme
amount of power over athletes and leaves little room, if any, for parties to
opt not to be bound.
An athlete is not only bound to IOC rules outside of competition.
The World Anti-Doping Agency (hereinafter the "WADA") was developed
in 1999 to monitor competitors according to a universal standard and
1361d. at 1149.
"Id. at 1150.
138 Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital, 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (quoting
Player v. Geo. M. Brewster & Son, Inc., 18 Cal. App. 3d 526, 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)); Windsor Mills,
Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 987, 993-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)).
"9 Id. at 356 (citing Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal.3d 11, 122 n.12 (Cal. 1975);
Steven v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 882 (Cal. 1962).
140 Baumann v. IOC (CAS 00/006), 2 Digest of CAS Awards 633, 633 (CAS ad hoc Division
2000).
141 Id. at 637.
142 
Id.143 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 58.
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procedure at all times. 1" Beginning with the 2004 Athens games, no nation
was permitted to compete at the Olympics without acquiescing to the
WADA. 145 The provisions of the WADA require all athletes be available
for, and consent to, testing at any time regardless of whether or not they are
actively competing.' 46 Out of competition testing was initiated because
doping allows an athlete to train harder, even if the athlete cycles off the
drugs prior to the competition in order to test clean. 147  This not only
supports the argument that amateur sports have become employment that
does not end after an event is over, but throws into stark light the extent of
the burden imposed by the IOC on an athlete to "consent" to CAS.
Employers have gone before courts numerous times with regard to
disputes arising out of arbitration clauses in employment contracts.
48
Courts tend to analyze employees' claims of unconscionability according
to the individual elements of each contract to determine whether the
agreement is procedurally and substantively fair. For example, Hooters
restaurant lost this type of dispute when the court found the employment
contract's arbitration terms "so one-sided [as to] undermine the neutrality of
the proceeding[s]," thereby invalidating the arbitration clause.' 49
The enforceability of the FEI arbitration clause is supported by the
fact that the organization is also bound to arbitrate. In another case
involving Circuit City, Circuit City was not bound to arbitrate.' 50 However,
it cannot be overlooked that applicants to Circuit City were, in a broad
sense, applying for retail jobs at one of any number of stores where
employers would hire them for the same type of work. A multitude of
employers and employment contracts are available within the retail
category. An equestrian athlete does not have such options. Within the
category of equestrian athletics, the IOC's rules are the only set available.
Therefore, an equestrian athlete's consent to arbitrate needs more careful
consideration than it has received. In the employment context, it cannot be
taken for granted that a competitor who has signed a membership
agreement has meaningfully consented.
144 DeFrantz, supra note 121, at 17-18.
14 51 Id. at 18.
146 WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE art. 2.4 (2009),
http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/code-v2009_En.pdf.
147 DeFrantz, supra note 121, at 17.
148 See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003); Ticknor v. Choice
Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir.
1999). Other courts have faced adhesion contract claims, but failed to find the contracts in question
invalid based on a view that the contracts were not adhesion contracts. See, e.g., C.H.I., Inc. v. Marcus
Brothers Textile, Inc., 930 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding no evidence that the contract at issue was a
contract of adhesion); Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 552 P.2d 1178, 1179-80 (Cal. 1976)
(rejecting adhesion contract argument based on plaintiff's opportunity to negotiate and bargaining
strength).
149 Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999).
150 Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, 328 F.3d 1165, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Three additional factors indicate that sports disputes will continue
to be submitted to arbitration, indicating a continuing need to focus on
fairness and the burden of arbitration on athletes. First, the Ted Stevens
Olympic and Amateur Sports Act provides for arbitration of sports disputes
without regard for the effect on an athlete. The fact that arbitration is
forced upon athletes, not only by the international sports structure but also
by the U.S. Congress, should add weight to the necessity of careful review
and contextualization of conflicts.
Second, Swiss courts have upheld CAS decisions despite their legal
consequences to the athlete. The Swiss Federal Tribunal found in A. & B.
v. IOC5' that two cross-country skiers, who were suspended for two years
for doping, had suffered "a genuine statutory punishment that affect[ed] the
legal interests of the person," but nevertheless found that the decision was
sufficiently independent to constitute a "true award[ ], equivalent of the
judgment of State courts."' 52  Thus, the governing judiciary backs CAS
awards, even where they affect legal rights.
Finally, American courts have upheld CAS decisions. In Slaney v.
International Amateur Athletic Federation,153 the Seventh Circuit affirmed
doping rulings under the New York Convention, confirming the
"unavailability of judicial intervention in disciplinary hearings ... except in
the most extraordinary circumstances."' 5 4 The Court found that requiring
athletes "to prove by clear and convincing evidence that" test results were
physiological and not chemical was not contrary to public policy.1
55
Generally, U.S. Federal Courts have opted not to intervene in a sports
dispute that is based on the merits of the case, but the courts have indicated
that they will hear disputes based on breach of contract, due process, or
between sports bodies pursuant to federal law. 5 6 This indicates that a case
could be constructed that would open judicial review to athletes.
The question of meaningful consent has largely been dismissed
because courts consider amateur sports to be hobbies rather than
employment. The general view is that consent occurs when the athlete
agrees to the terms of membership and enters a competition. However,
151 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 53 (quoting A. & B. v. 1OC, Swiss Fed. Tribunal, 1st Civil
Chamber, May 27, 2003).152 id.
'53 Slaney v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001).
154 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 159-60.
... Slaney, 244 F.3d at 594. See also NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 159-60.
156 BLACKSHAW, supra note 23, at 4. See also, e.g., Tonya Harding v. U.S. Figure Skating
Ass'n, 851 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Or. 1994) (expressing reluctance to intervene in the private dispute
between and athlete and governing body, but finding that the body had acted unreasonably and denied
due process to the defendant. Finding was moot as defendant had already resigned from the body);
Michels v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1984) (Finding that U.S. federal law
created no private right of action for athletes but a means of resolving disputes between sports bodies).
But see generally SOEK, supra note 45 (arguing that the punitive nature and goal of enforcing the rules
of a governing agency make doping cases criminal).
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once the extraordinary hardships that are unique to equestrian competition
are considered in the analysis, and the rider's quest is considered
employment, a more critical examination of whether or not the "employee"
has truly consented to arbitrate will be required.157 Acknowledgment of
consent may not destroy the availability of the arbitration process, but
whether the arbitration process is appropriate to settle disputes is a question
that should also consider that strict liability is applied in equestrian doping
proceedings.
IV. SADDLE BAGS: BEARING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
A Swiss Court has ruled that doping sanctions are civil and not
criminal and, therefore, not subject to the same standard of proof or
presumption of innocence.1 58 This decision left the CAS to fashion its own
standard of proof, thereby a doctrine was developed very much akin to
traditional strict liability. 5 9 "Thus, the mere fact of a positive doping result
may justify the disqualification of the person responsible.' 160  Although
some scholars have found this strict liability policy to conform with
international legal standards,' 6' little has been done to consider the
application of this standard in the context of equestrian sports. Contrarily,
some scholars have criticized the use of strict liability in imposing sanctions
beyond disqualification.162  One commentator suggested that changes in
sport have shifted the balance of the analysis; fairness to other athletes is no
longer a sufficient consideration to allow a finding of guilt without proof of
fault when competition is often the only activity and employment of the
athlete. 63  With such high stakes to the individual, the aforementioned
commentator suggested that panels should consider the "subjective
157 Cf SOEK, supra note 45, at 318-22 (discussing the lack of consent to arbitrate doping
violations even by traditional professional athletes, which makes doping regulations more akin to
criminal law of a private organization).
158 Frank Oschitz, International Sports Law Perspectives: Harmonization of Anti-Doping
Code Through Arbitration: The Case Law of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L.J.
675, 695 (2002).
19 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 934 (8th ed. 2004) ("Strict Liability: Liability that does
not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to
make something safe. Strict liability most often applies either to ultrahazardous activities or in
products-liability cases.").
160 Oschfltz, supra note 158, at 686.
161 Connolly, supra note 9, at 195; GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER, GIORGIO MALINVERNI
& ANTONIO RIGOZZI, LEGAL OPINION ON THE CONFORMITY OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT
WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE WITH COMMONLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY 53 (2003), http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/kaufmann-
kohler-full.pdf.
162 Oschitz, supra note 158, at 688-89; e.g., SOEK, supra note 45, at 386-89 (asserting that
the CAS itself is one of the main critics of the strict liability system that denies athletes the opportunity
to exonerate themselves).
163 Oschztz, supra note 158, at 688-89.
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elements of each case."' 64 The monopolistic hierarchy of modem sports
regulation amplifies both the power imbalance and the cost to the athlete.,
65
Against this split of authority and the universal application of strict liability
by CAS, the unique concerns of equestrian competitors demand recognition
and a more sophisticated analysis during dispute resolution.
A. Bringing the Charge
The CAS confirmed in 2002 that the IOC must initially prove three
things in a doping case: "that [the] sample was properly taken," that the
chain of custody is complete, and that the test for the substance in question
is reliable. 66 Proving these preliminary elements establishes a rebuttable
presumption that testing and custody were in accordance with prevailing
acceptable standards.1 67  Following a positive test and the satisfaction of
these three elements, the CAS shifts the burden to the athlete to rebut the
double presumption of the use of the prohibited substance and culpability
for use. 68 The athlete must show either a lack of knowledge of ingestion,
or innocence of ingestion of any item containing a prohibited substance,
including pills, injections, or food.16 9 If an athlete can establish either of
these defenses, his or her sanctions may be mitigated, with the exception of
event disqualification.1 70  There is no way for an athlete to lift
disqualification absent disproving one of the elements that the IOC or IF
demonstrated initially.1 71 To rebut the presumption of guilt, the athlete
must prove that the doping was the result of an act of ill will by a third
party or that an error existed in the testing lab's result. 172 Otherwise, the
CAS has settled on a standard 2-year suspension of eligibility for
unmitigated violations and termination for repeat offenders.
173
The CAS has established a "comfortable satisfaction of the hearing
panel" burden of proof standard, which the CAS defined as "greater than a
mere balance of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable
164Id.
6' Id. at 689.
16 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 156 (citing Lazutina v. 1OC (CAS 2002/A/370), 3 Digest of
CAS Awards 273,279 (2002)).
167 id.
'6JId. at 157.
'
69 
Id. (citing A. v. FILA (CAS 2000/A/317), 3 Digest of CAS Awards 159 (2001)).
"' Id. at 157-58.
171 See id.
172 Frank Oschtitz, Doping Cases Before the CAS and the World Anti-Doping Code, in THE
COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004, supra note 13, at 246, 254 (citing S. v FEI (CAS
91/56), 1 Digest of CAS Awards 93, 96 (1992); N. v. FEI (CAS 92/73), 1 Digest of CAS Awards CAS
153, 157 (1992); Gundel v. FEI (CAS 92/63), 1 Digest of CAS Awards 115, 121 (1992).
173 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 159.
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doubt."' 17 4 The official comment in the CAS code compares this standard to
that applied to professional misconduct cases in most countries.' The
previously discussed Gundel v. FEI Decision'7 6 upheld the burden shifting
embodied in the FEI rules for doping cases because the procedure is not
criminal per se, and the presumption of innocence standard "belongs to the
realm of criminal law."' 7 7 One rationale proposed to justify this burden of
proof is that sports federations lack the prosecutorial authority to investigate
claims and compel the production of sufficient evidence to satisfy a
criminal court. 178  This reasoning is flawed, however, because federations
may have less power and fewer resources than prosecutors, but they do
have exponentially more resources than most athletes, who do not have the
guarantee of constitutional protections, prosecutorial ethics limitations, or
meaningful appeal rights. By limiting the comparison to the relative power
and resources of an IF versus a prosecutor, the most relevant comparison in
any case is ignored: the power imbalance between the charging body and
the accused person.
B. Defenses
A federation is required to prove nothing other than the presence of
a substance. Any other proof must be offered by the athlete who may not
know that he or she has tested positive until long after a competitive event.
This burden puts an athlete in the position of having to remember details
and coincidences of an event that may have taken place weeks before. By
that time, countless other horses, people, and events will have passed
through the facility. Any chance for the athlete to collect evidence or
discover the cause of the violation could be long gone, destroying any
possibility of a defense. The IF may argue the difficulty of proving intent,
but the fact remains that an athlete has almost no opportunity to investigate
or present a defense.
The CAS has similarly claimed that requiring a federation to prove
intent would make the fight against doping "practically impossible."' 79 But
like all slippery slope arguments, this one deals in absolutes, weighing in on
sport's side of the teetering balance between fairness to the athlete and
fairness to the sport. There is room for proof of intent to play a role,
174 WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, WORLD ANTI-DoPING CODE art. 3.1(2009),
http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/code-v2009_En.pdf.
175 James A. R. Nafziger, Circumstantial Evidence of Doping: BALCO and Beyond, 16
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 45, 51 (2005).
176 Gundel v. FEI (CAS 92/63), 1 Digest of CAS Awards 115, 121 (1992).
177 Jan Paulsson, Arbitration of International Sports Disputes, in THE COURT OF
ARBrrRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004, supra note 13, at 40, 47.
178 Oschotz, supra note 172, at 255.179 Connolly, supra note 9, at 182.
2009-2010]
KY. J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L.
however, especially where an allegation of doping involves a drug that
could actually suppress performance, or where no doubt exists regarding
the inefficacy of the drug or its concentration in the athlete's system.
Simply raising the burden of proof to "beyond a reasonable doubt" in
equestrian cases would give athletes a reasonable opportunity to vindicate
themselves without undermining the legitimate fight against doping.
The CAS stated in one case that individual fairness was not their
objective, at least not with regard to the individual athlete. 80 The CAS
justified this policy on grounds of fairness to the other athletes rather than
to the accused, comparing unintentional doping to food poisoning as an
accidental and irreparable unfairness of life. 181  CAS asserted that
unintended faultless doping and doping without actual effect, though
unfortunate (like food poisoning), remain insufficient to justify allowing a
tainted athlete to compete against a clean athlete. 8 2  But unlike
unintentional doping, the misfortunes of food poisoning cannot be
controlled by an adjudicatory body or corrected by administrative policy.
There is, however, room to prevent the fight against doping from
overshadowing the very sports that the CAS seeks to protect.
Not only do lack of intent and ordinary diligence remain
insufficient to escape a doping charge, a rider cannot use lack of actual
performance enhancement as a defense either. Sixteen year-old gymnast
Andreea Raducan won the gold medal at the 2000 Sydney Olympics, but
was essentially stripped of her medal for being treated for a cold.183
Raducan had been given a standard cold tablet during the Olympic Games
after she consulted the team's physician regarding her cold symptoms.'
84
Unbeknownst to Raducan, the tablet contained pseudoephedrine, a
prohibited substance.' 85  While recognizing that the amount of
pseudoephedrine detected could not have affected her performance, the
panel disqualified her anyway under the banner of a "drug-free sport" and
"enforce[ment] without compromise. ' 86
In a similar case, a member of the National Wheelchair Basketball
Association was found guilty of doping during the 1992 Barcelona
Paralympics. 187  The athlete's coach checked the list of prohibited
"0 USA Shooting & Quigley v. Int'l Shooting Union (CAS 94/129), 1 Digest of CAS
Awards 187, 194 (1995).
"'1 Id. at 193.
82 Id. at 193-94.
"3 See Andreea Raducan v. 1OC (CAS 00/011), 2 Digest of CAS Awards 665 (CAS ad hoc
Division 2000).
84 Id. at 673.
,85 Connolly, supra note 9, at 181.
186 Andreea Raducan v. lOC (CAS 00/011), 2 Digest of CAS Awards 665, 673 (CAS ad hoc
Division 2000).
187 Nat'l Wheelchair Basketball Ass'n (NWBA) v. Int'l Paralympic Comm. (CAS 95/122), 1
Digest of CAS Awards 173, 173 (1996).
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substances prior to giving the athlete a Darvocet tablet for an injury," 8 but
unfortunately, one of the components of Darvocet was on the list of
prohibited substances which lead to disqualification despite the substance's
lack of effect on performance and the attempts by the coach to assure
compliance with the rules. 189 The CAS panel refused to subject doping to
"subjective factors" and found the athlete's guilt of doping sufficiently
established due to his "fail[ure] to keep his body free of banned
substances."'' 90 The justification for this guilt standard is based on the
extraordinary level of care expected of athletes. The most basic
presumption underlying this approach is that,
athletes themselves are the only ones who can properly
take responsibility to proactively ensure that no banned
substances enter their bodies. This duty is thrust upon them
contractually and ethically by their participation in their
sport. This burden on the athletes is essential to ensure the
integrity of the sports in which they compete.' 9'
The CAS does not accept as a defense that an athlete was given a
medication or supplement by someone who should have known better (such
as physicians or trainers) because it is the sole responsibility of the athlete
to monitor and regulate what enters his or her body. 92
For an equestrian athlete charged with doping her horse, the above
theory fails. The rider is responsible for both him or herself and for testing
their horse to ensure that any properly administered, but prohibited
substances, have been eliminated from the horse's system prior to
competition. If the medicines have not disappeared, the rider is obliged to
refrain from participation. 193 A review of all published CAS decisions
concerning horse doping shows that this issue is not discussed in any
published analysis.' 94 The CAS seems to have taken a "tough luck"
approach to the separation of rider and horse. Panels process horse doping
allegations the same way they process charges against human athletes,
despite the fact that horses and riders are almost always housed separately
and sometimes miles apart. Equestrians have an exceedingly difficult task
in this respect, considering that they may have no way of knowing all that a
188 Id.
1
89 Id.
'90Id at 177-78.
'"9 Connolly, supra note 9, at 184.
'92 Id. at 192-93.
'9' SJ. v. FEI (CAS 92/71), 1 Digest of CAS Awards 135, 135 (1992).
194 See DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS I 1986-1998 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 1998); DIGEST OF CAS
AWARDS II 1998-2000 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2002).
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horse has been exposed to in a shared stabling area while being attended to
by various staffers.
According to arbitrators following the WADA guidelines, an
athlete must establish that even with the "utmost caution," he or she could
not have reasonably suspected that a prohibited substance had been
administered in order to avoid fault or liability.'9" This "very high standard
[can] be met only in exceptional circumstances."'' 96 Some federations even
specify that allegations of mistake, contamination of supplements, or
intentional sabotage will not be considered "exceptional," and as of 2005,
no decision under the WADA's rules contained a finding of "no fault or
liability."' 97 A lesser standard of no significant fault or liability is available
if an athlete shows that "his or her negligence . . . was not significant in
relation[ ] to the" doping violation.1 98  Proof of no significant fault or
liability can reduce a sanction only by half, and occasionally athletes take
advantage of this standard and had their sanctions reduced.' 99
There has been some recognition among CAS arbitrators that a
higher burden must be met to find an athlete guilty of more serious
allegations, such as those involving deliberate dishonesty.2°° This indicates
that the "comfortable satisfaction of the hearing body" standard of proof is
less of a standard, and more of a spectrum.20' One CAS advisory opinion
authorized panels to consider subjective elements of individual cases, but
only in terms of adapting sanctions.2 °2 Under this opinion, the duty
remained with the athlete to "show why maximum sanctions should not be
imposed. 20 3 Therefore, the CAS has the ability to fashion standards of
review to suit narrower classes of cases, as opposed to simply grouping all
"doping" cases in the same category, and could theoretically establish an
altered review system for equestrians.
195 Connolly, supra note 9, at 188.
'96 Id. at 188-89.
'9"Id. at 189.
198 Id.
1" Id. at 189-92 (citing Squizzato v. FINA (CAS 05/A/830) (2005) (unpublished) (where a
17 year-old swimmer used a cream given to her by her mother for an infection between her toes, which
contained a prohibited substance); Knauss v. FHdlration Internationale de Ski (CAS 05/A/847) (2005)
(unpublished) (where a downhill skier took a multivitamin after reading the label and checking with the
distributor about banned substances, but later tested positive for prohibited substance)).
200 Connelly, supra note 9, at 176.
201 See id.
202 Oschitltz, supra note 158, at 698-99 (citing F~dration Frangaise de Triathlon &
International Triathlon Union (CAS 93/109), 1 Digest of CAS Awards 467, 471 (CAS Advisory
Opinion 1994).
203 Oschitz, supra note 158, at 699 (citing N., J., Y., W. v. Fdlration Internationale de
Natation (CAS 98/208), 2 Digest of CAS Awards 234, 253 (1998).
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C. False Positives
False positives are a pervasive and evolving problem. Louisiana
State University recently studied the stabling areas of racetracks and found
enough medication in the dust and water to produce false positive test
results.2° Substances such as flunixin and phenylbutazone ("bute") were
present and potentially detectable in a horse's excreta. The refusal of the
FEI and CAS to set minimum levels of contamination seems highly
problematic as tests become more sensitive. As a consequence of
atmospheric contamination, horses that are not competing but receiving
legitimate veterinary treatments could contaminate competing horses in the
same stable.
Despite the high degree of care used by groomers and riders, and
the safeguards of taking two test samples, the realistic chance of a false
positive throws the strict liability doctrine, as applied to equestrians, into
serious question. False positives are a threat to both the doping fight and
the livelihood of athletes. For example, human growth hormone testing
was withdrawn from the 2005 Tour de France due to uncertainty about the
test's validity.20 5 Pulling a test that is already in use shows that athletes
may be disqualified and sanctioned based on faulty tests with no reasonable
way to prove it.
D. New Developments
Another growing problem in the sports world is the use of
undetectable or difficult-to-detect drugs.206 Unfortunately, the responses to
these drugs exaggerate the issues surrounding testing and sanctioning of
athletes. Two possible responses to undetectable drugs include the use of
non-analytical positive evidence, such as documents indicating purchase of
prohibited substances, and athletic profiling.20 7 Athletic profiling proposes
a system of gathering biological profiles of each athlete and putting the
information on an identification card.20 ' Then, significant deviations in the
elements of an athlete's unique biological profile (e.g., hormone levels or
hemoglobin concentrations) could trigger investigation of the athlete's
possible use of prohibited substances.20 9
204 Sources of False Positives?, EQUUS, Mar. 2009, at 12, 12 (citing S. A. Barker, Drug
Contamination of the Equine Racetrack Environment: A Preliminary Examination, 31 J. OF
VETERINARY PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS 466 (2008)).
205 Nafziger, supra note 175, at 46.
206 For brevity's sake, both types will be referred to as "undetectable" drugs.
207 Nafziger, supra note 175, at 47.
208 Id.
'09 Id. at 55.
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Perhaps the best example of the implications of using non-
analytical evidence can be seen in the Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative
(hereinafter "BALCO") incident of 2004.210 BALCO was reported
anonymously to the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency for manufacturing and
selling an undetectable drug, THG. 211 Following an investigation of the
substance and BALCO itself, BALCO's records were used to pursue
doping charges against a significant number of athletes. 212  Suspensions
followed, reputations were compromised, and some careers were ended
based on no more than the documents of a laboratory.213 Many of these
records were coded, cryptic, and did not mention athletes by name.214
So-called "blood doping' 215 illustrates yet another problem with the
drive to combat new doping techniques. Blood doping involves the use of
rEPO (recombinant erythropoietin), which occurs naturally in humans and
boosts the production of red blood cells, in turn boosting endurance by
increasing the blood's oxygen-carrying capacity.2 16 Because rEPO occurs
naturally and the operative mechanism is simply more of the athlete's own
blood cells,217 it is extremely difficult to tell when an athlete uses this
technique. A test for identifying blood doping was first accepted as valid
during a legal proceeding in 2002 and resulted in the suspension of several
athletes.218 The panel hearing the proceeding determined that WADA
criteria "largely eliminate[d] the risk of false positives. 219 Unfortunately, it
was later shown that the WADA criteria could result in false positives and
depended inordinately on the expertise of the laboratory technician
interpreting the test results.220 This problem led WADA to institute an
additional requirement that rEPO test results must be reviewed by a lab
known to have expertise with rEPO tests before positive results could be
reported.22'
210 Id. at 51-52.
211 Id. at 51.
212 Id. at 51-52 (including 4 NFL players, 4 track and field athletes, and 5-7% of all tested
MLB players).
213 Id. at 52-53.
214 Id. at 52.
215 World Anti-Doping Agency, Q&A: Blood Doping, http://www.wada-ama.org/ (follow
"Resources - Q&A" hyperlink; then follow "Q&A on Blood Doping" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 13,
2009).
216 Connolly, supra note 9, at 168.
2 17 id.
218 Id. (citing Meier v. Swiss Cycling (CAS 2001/A/345), 3 Digest of CAS Award 238, 238
(2002). 2 9 Id. (citing Int'l Ass'n of Athletics Fed'ns v. Fdration Royale Marocaine d'Athltisme &
Boulaimi (CAS 2002/A/452), 3 Digest of CAS Awards 440, 440 (2003).
220 id.
22' Id. at 169.
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Undetectable drugs and blood doping are among the primary
rationales behind the argument for using athletic profiling.222 New
developments in undetectable drugs and blood doping undermine the fight
against doping, especially when viewed in combination with the low
standard of proof required to disqualify or suspend an athlete.
E. Conclusion
The CAS may only impose penalties according to the rules set out
by the governing body of each individual sport. For equestrians, the body
that sets the penalties is the FEI. FEI regulations specifically empower the
CAS to increase the penalties imposed by the body below, essentially
permitting de novo review of penalties by CAS and putting athletes at risk
for greater sanctions if they appeal a decision by a lower body.223 The FEI
itself may impose warnings, fines up to 20,000 Swiss francs (approximately
$19,825), disqualification, and suspension for any duration, including
life. 24 Although most CAS decisions affirm or reduce the penalties
imposed by an IF, the potential for increased sanctions operates as a threat
to an athlete who contemplates challenging an IF decision. When faced
with the threat of greater sanctions, athletes may be less willing to
challenge test results when they have no access to proof and, therefore are
less likely to raise questions about accuracy.
Reliance on the strict liability doctrine in sports arbitration creates
significant difficulties. The inconsistent imposition of this standard of
proof leads one to believe it is more flexible than a fixed standard. In the
case of equestrian sports, this inconsistency may actually open the door to a
fairer system of examination. Equestrians lack the basic corporeal control
over their mounts that other athletes are presumed to have over their own
bodies. Riders are held responsible for things that happen to their horses,
even when they are far away from the stable areas. Research on false
positives indicates that even with the highest care by athletes and
caretakers, a horse may still be exposed to detectable levels of prohibited
substances by simply being in a stable where other animals have received
such substances.
222 Nafziger, supra note 175, at 55; Ian Austen, Athletic Profiling: A Better Way to Catch
Those Who Dope, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 12, 2004, at 24, 24.
223 FEDtRATION EQUESTRE INTERNATIONALE, FEI GENERAL REGULATIONS art. 162 (23rd
ed. 2009), http://www.fei.org/Rules/Documents/General%20Regulations%2023rd%20edition%20-
1%20January0/o202009%20-%20fnal.pdf.
224 1d. at art. 161.
225 Sources of False Positives?, EQuus, Mar. 2009, at 12, 12 (citing S. A. Barker, Drug
Contamination of the Equine Racetrack Environment: A Preliminary Examination, 31 J. OF
VETERINARY PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS 466 (2008)).
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Consideration of these issues must enter into the analysis of the
strict liability doctrine applied to horse doping cases, which require not just
fairness to the athlete but recognition that no amount of care can prevent
some violations from occurring. While it is easier to support a sanction of
disqualification to prevent unfairness to other athletes, additional sanctions
need to be considered in light of problems with the system itself as well as
the differences between other athletes and equestrians who compete as a
team of rider and horse.
V. ANALYSIS
Currently, the IOC recognizes 205 separate nations or entities, and
192 of these independent entities are states recognized by the United
226Nations. Litigation subject to the laws of so many legal systems would
be crippling to an endeavor as massive as the Olympics. 227 The Sieracki-
Lindland conflict, which involved the denial of an award by USA
Wrestling's Standing Greco-Roman Sport Committee, demonstrates the
mind-boggling mess that courts can make of a sports dispute, as well as the
failure of domestic court remedies in international competition.228 Internal
administrative remedies also remain insufficient because an athlete is put in
the position of defending against the very body that writes the rules, makes
the accusation, and then sits as prosecutor, witness, judge, and jury.229
Internal administrative remedies could prove more satisfactory,
however, if an athlete keeps a home in Switzerland, as German cyclist
Danilo Hondo did.230 By maintaining a residence in Vaud, Switzerland,
Hondo successfully classified his dispute as a domestic/local dispute under
Swiss law and sought intervention by the Vaud Court of Appeals. 23' His
remedy under Swiss law included an injunction against his suspension,
pending a full hearing into whether the strict liability principle violated
basic Swiss rights.232 Hondo was the first athlete ever to convince a
domestic court to suspend a CAS ruling.233 The Swiss court eventually
overturned the suspension, but it was later reinstated by the Swiss Supreme
226 Olympic.org, National Olympic Committees, http://www.olympic.org/en/content
/National-Olympic-Committees (follow "What is a National Olympic Committee (NOCs)?" hyperlink)
(last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
227 Yi, supra note 35, at 301-02.
221 See id. at 302-03 (discussing the Butch Reynolds case); Nafiger, supra note 70, at 360-
71.
229 Yi, supra note 35, at 304-05.
230 Id. at 337-38.
231 id.
232 Id. at 338.
233 Id.
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Court.234 This loophole has yet to be closed and allows disputes between
Swiss residents and organizations access to a court system that most
athletes do not enjoy.
Another recent development is lex sportiva, the emerging body of
law based on the accumulation of semi-precedential CAS opinions
regarding international sports law.235 Unlike lex mercantoria, it is not
currently developed enough to be available as a choice of law in and of
itself.236  However, it may eventually develop to such a level as CAS
becomes more deeply entrenched in the world of international sports. But
as with any private arbitration scheme, confidentiality, limited discovery,
and flexibility of remedies will likely keep the development of lex sportiva
slow and limited in effect.237
One of the elements making sports dispute arbitration unique is the
very small number of disputes with a win-win result, 238 especially when the
outcome determines who receives a place on the Olympic team or whether
an accused athlete is disqualified and stripped of a medal and prize money.
Most sports disputes require an A or B decision with very little room for
compromise 239; the CAS cannot simply declare two gold-medalists or place
an extra athlete on an Olympic team. This limitation may add to the
legitimacy of the CAS by creating a more judicially analytical system or
could undermine the system with the impression that the CAS is beholden
to its primary financier because it finds parties guilty to justify anti-doping
efforts.
The CAS provides the Olympics the distinct advantage of removing
public relations snarls from the shiny medal podiums and pristine fields of
the games. When an unpopular decision comes down, it is the adjudicatory
body of the CAS that bears the criticism, not the IOC. 240 Thus, the "cash
cow" of the greater Olympic program keeps grazing while the CAS cleans
up the manure.2 41 Athletes, on the other hand, get a mixed bag from the
CAS. Forced to agree to rigid, standard terms or be excluded from
competition, athletes have zero bargaining power with respect to their
rights.242 However, the CAS does require that arbitrators have expertise in
sport, which many judges lack.243 Additionally, the IF and IOC typically
234 Hondo Still Waiting for Decision, CYCLING NEWS, Apr. 19, 2007,
http://www.cyclingnews.com/editions/first-edition-cycling-news-for-april-19-2007.
233 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 48-49.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 49.
238 BLACKSHAW, supra note 23, at 1 18.
2 39 
Id.
240 Yi, supra note 35, at 309.
24' Id. at 312.
242 Id. at 312-13.
243 BLACKSHAW, supra note 23, at 121.
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honor a CAS ruling in favor of an athlete, which may not always be true for
an independent court's decision.2 "
An imbalance in power remains with regard to the pool of
arbitrators, however, since the IOC, IFs, and NOCs appoint three-fifths of
the pool of 250 arbitrators. 245 The ICAS itself appoints the remaining
arbitrators.246  The list of appointees clearly favors those who are
recommended by the institutions who bring charges against an athlete.247
While Gundel prompted the restructuring of CAS funding, the CAS is still
fully funded by governing bodies, with three-fourths of the budget coming
from the IOC and Summer and Winter Olympic Committees. 248  The
remaining one-fourth of the CAS budget comes from NOCs. 249 CAS'
funding method still causes concern, as the CAS remains financially
dependent on its most frequent litigants.250 A paradoxical situation results
because athletes are forced to agree to the jurisdiction of a body appointed
and funded by the very organizations that levy charges against them and are
then left with no access to courts in the event of an unfair outcome. At least
one commentator has suggested that the formation of a union of Olympic
athletes may be on the horizon. 251 Such a union could protect athletes from
the stacked system, even if only as a means of acquiring appointment rights
to the arbitrator list.
"Sports are special and so are athletes. But their special status
means a higher standard of conduct .... In all litigation and arbitration of
all sports-related disputes, the public interest, including the best interests of
sports, should be paramount. 252 For equestrians, safety is an additional
concern, as potentially dangerous drugs risk the health and safety of both
the athletes and their horses. An athlete who drugs a horse also creates a
serious risk of injury or death to bystanders and workers should the horse
break loose with stimulants or excessive pain medication in its system.
These concerns support the current policy of automatic disqualification
when a horse tests positive for prohibited substances, but still permits
quantitative assessment and should not always warrant the imposition of
additional sanctions.
244 Yi, supra note 35, at 313.
245 Id. at 316.
246 id.
'4 Id. at 316, 318.2481 Id. at 317.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 317-318.
251 Id. at 318.252 NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 108.
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The FEI rules permit the consideration of other individuals as
responsible for a violation,253 but no published CAS case involving horse
doping has held anyone other than the rider responsible. The FEI rules,
therefore, do account for the fact that a rider is not always able to fully
control or monitor a horse the way an archer controls his or her body.
There is no reason to think that in finding one other than the rider
responsible for doping that the CAS would undermine the interests of the
public or the sport. A rider simply cannot oversee everything the horse is
exposed to, nor can a rider reason with a horse like a relay runner might
reason with a teammate, asking her to be cautious about what she eats or
touches lest the team be held accountable. The standard applied to a
gymnast who seeks a physician's advice and takes a cold tablet is simply
not appropriate to apply to a rider housed at a distance from her horse
during an event.
VI. THE FINISH LINE
Rules were "designed many years before the current Olympic
Charter and Amateur Sports Act" to govern amateur athletes who, at that
time, were expected to have independent means of support.254 These rules
are now applied to "all athletes, amateur (under the modem definition
unrelated to financial circumstances) or professional, who seek to become
eligible for sanctioned international competition under the Olympic Charter
and Amateur Sports Act," to those who are dependent on subsidies and
required to be eligible for Olympic competition.255 Violations that would
keep a multi-million-dollar professional athlete out of play for 10 days can
put an unsalaried Olympic amateur athlete with no player's union out for
two years.216 Equestrian athletes are especially hard hit by the one-size-fits-
all approach of the CAS. These competitors have far less control over their
horses than over themselves, but are held to the same standards. Penalties
that would force a sprinter to run at a local high school track instead of a
state-of-the art facility can drive an equestrian into an untenable situation:
selling his horse and losing the development of a successful relationship
and years of investment, or provide substandard care in hopes of waiting
out the penalty.
253 FtDIRATION EQUESTRE INTERNATIONALE, FEI GENERAL REGULATIONS art. 118 (23rd
ed. 2009), http://www.fei.org/Rules/Documents/General%20Regulations%2023rd%2Oedition%20-
1%20JanuaryO/o202009%20-%20fmal.pdf.
254 Telephone interview with James A. R. Nafziger, Professor, Williamette College of Law
(Mar. 24,2009).
255 Id.
256 L. ELAINE HALCHIN, ANTI-DOPING POLICIES: THE OLYMPICS AND SELECTED
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS CRS-12 (2005), https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207
/2423/RL32894_20050429.pdfsequence=1.
2009-2010]
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A dual track of penalties or a more thorough consideration of
proportionality should be introduced into the lex sportiva of equestrian
doping arbitration.257 Arbitration rules and decisions must account for the
potential discriminatory effect of sanctions on equestrians. Sanctions affect
a competitor with the financial ability to support his or her horse
significantly less than they affect a competitor of modest means. At the
very least, the CAS should consider the proportionality of sanctions on
equestrians compared to other athletes, particularly the disparate financial
impact suffered by riders under the standard two-year penalty.258 The CAS
can reasonably consider that a three or six month suspension is as severe a
penalty to a rider as a two year suspension is to a skater.
While CAS decisions show less concern for fairness to an accused
athlete than to other competitors, dogma cannot be so powerful as to render
the CAS a blind hammer. Recognizing the very real difference in control
over the ingestion of prohibited substances and that equestrian athletes
remain bound to their employment regardless of competitive eligibility
would not undermine the CAS' purpose or the fight against doping.
Introduction of such considerations has the potential to complicate
decisions, but this alone cannot be sufficient cause to deny equestrians such
fundamental safeguards. Evolving sophistication is the hallmark of any
legal system, and if the CAS is here to stay, it will have to accept this
change. Change should begin with fair consideration given to the unique
concerns facing Olympic level equestrians and their magnificent horses.
257 Nafziger, supra note 254.
258 See NAFZIGER, supra note 10, at 107.
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